In 1921 Mexico produced a quarter of world's petroleum, making the country the second largest producer in the world, but by 1930 it only accounted for 3 per cent of world's production. To date the discussion has mostly relied on events taking place in Mexico for explaining the decline of the industry. Very little attention has been placed to developments in petroleum industry elsewhere, except Venezuela. Practically no attention has been paid to the reasons for the rise of oil output in Mexico. This neglects the massive changes taking place in the petroleum industry worldwide during the Great War years and its aftermath, and overall ignores the shortage of oil that occurred in the world's markets between 1918-1921. These are crucial events in order to understand the early rise of the Mexican oil industry and set the basis for a better understanding of the subsequent sudden decline.
INTRODUCTION
In 1921 Mexico produced a quarter of world's oil, making the country the second most important producer in the world, but by 1930 it only accounted for 3 per cent of world's production. In 1938 the petroleum industry was nationalised by the Mexican government and it took it over fifty years to regain the level of output of 1921. Two main lines of arguments have been used in order to explain the rapid decline of the Mexican oil industry during the 1920s. The first explanation argues that the decline was the result of the institutional change caused by the Mexican Revolution. The second hypothesis vindicates that Mexico simply run out of oil deposits that could be extracted at competitive costs given technology, prices and competing sources. Some authors have argued that both hypotheses are true. The problem is that the discussion has mostly relied on events taking place in Mexico, using sources and data exclusively relating to Mexico. Very little attention has been placed to developments in petroleum industry elsewhere, except Venezuela. Practically no attention has been paid to the reasons for the sudden rise of oil output in Mexico. This neglects the massive changes taking place in the petroleum industry worldwide during the Great War years and overall ignores the shortage of oil that occurred in the world markets between [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] . These are crucial events in order to understand the rise of the Mexican oil industry and set the basis for a better understanding of the subsequent sudden decline.
Due to the Great War and the Soviet Revolution, Europe lost all its domestic supplies of oil and, become totally dependent on its Asian oil supplies (Dutch East Indies and British India) and overall, on the United States. Mexican oil was to play a major role at this time of shortage. This paper focuses on the rise of the Mexican oil industry by concentrating on the events taking place in the world's petroleum industry. Thanks to the data of the American Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Mexican Government it is possible to place Mexico in the changing context of the world oil markets of the early 1920s. In addition, it shed some extra light into the debate about the rapid fall of the industry.
The first section of this paper reviews the literature debate, revealing how little attention has been paid to the raise of the industry, and how much concentrated on events within Mexico has the debate remained. The second section steps out of Mexico in order to show the extensive changes taking place in the oil industry worldwide during the First World War and its aftermath, including the surge in demand and the awaken of nationalism world-wide regarding the exploitation of oil resources. The intense growth of demand for petroleum products was not followed by an equal growth in supply. The distortions introduced by the War, the Soviet Revolution, the cold winters of the end of the 1910s, plus the final War effort produced the first petroleum shortage of the 20 th century. Section three reveals the importance of Mexican oil at this time of shortage.
Section four peeks at the sudden decline of the Mexican petroleum industry departing from the depiction of the rise of the industry provided in earlier sections. The conclusions summarise the main findings of this paper.
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE EARLY MEXICAN OIL INDUSTRY: A REVIEW
The development of the oil industry in the South of the United States and the similarity of its coastal area to that of northern Mexico attracted world-wide attention in the first two decades of the 20 th century. A long dictatorship, Porfirio Díaz (1876 Díaz ( -1911 , brought political stability and legal facilities that encouraged foreign investors to explore the countries' oil 1 . Mexico started commercial oil production in 1901, although it took almost a decade to produce meaningful amounts. In the following decades hundreds of oil companies were organized to exploit the Mexican subsoil. Between 1911 and 1921, the foreign enclaves, especially the oil industry, stood out as islands of prosperity in the sea of destitution caused by the Mexican Revolution 2 . In the midst of coups, revolutions, counter-revolutions and a general state of civil war, the oil companies managed to make of Mexico the world's main oil exporter and second world's producer.
At its peak, Mexico produced a quarter of world's oil, but ten years later in 1931, it only accounted for 3 per cent of world production. As it can be observed in Figure 1 , it took over fifty years to regain the level of output of 1921. Two main lines of arguments have been used in order to explain the rapid decline of the Mexican oil industry in the 1920s.
The first explanation argues that the decline was the result of the institutional change caused by the Mexican Revolution. The second hypothesis vindicates that Mexico's oil fields simply become exhausted. Some authors have argued that a fatal combination of both gives reason for the rapid decline of the Mexican oil industry.
1 The following works provide good insight into the economic history of the early part of the twentieth century: Cárdenas (1992 Cárdenas ( -1994 ; Colegio de México (1960) ; Colegio de México (1965) ; Haber (1989); Reynolds (1970) . 2 Knight (1992) , p.295. See also Thorp (1998), p.68 and Reynolds (1970) who initially demonstrated this. 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1935 The first chapters of the following books, provide a good review of the initial stages of the Mexican oil industry: Grayson (1980 ); López Portillo (1975); Menéndez (1958); Owen (1975); PEMEX (1988) , Vol. 1, and Chapter 8 in Rippy (1972) . For Mexican governments relations with the companies see the first chapter of Bermudez (1963) and also Baldridge (1987) . 4 Yerguin (1991), p.232 were freely granted to foreign individuals and companies, and there were no restrictions on natives selling oil lands to foreigners. Mexican governments paralysed exploration and reduced production by foreign companies, leading to the early decline of the Mexican oil industry.
Other authors reject the importance of the institutional factors in the decay of the Mexican oil industry. For instance, Thorp (1989) argued that the potential threat posed by the 1917 Constitution was not taken very seriously in the 1920s. Haber et al. (2003) recourse; the companies, it has been argued, could also withhold output and deny the Mexican government crucial tax revenues. Figure 2 shows the importance of petroleum taxes for the Mexican government, at its maximum they accounted for almost 20 per cent of the fiscal income of the government. 1912 -1920 : México (1925 On the side of the companies, it seems, increases in taxes had only a minor impact on corporate rates of return. In fact, it has been also claimed by Haber et al. (2003) , the companies continued to explore and invest well after output began to fall. According to this view, fields were being totally exhausted under private exploitation. Oil was such an important element that its exploitation should be beyond individual interest.
Oil should not be extracted for profit but for the salvation of a society. In addition, the companies were accused of hiding profits (see Silva Herzog (1938)). The companies were said to be distorting information about their profit margins in order to evade taxes.
The companies were not only exhausting Mexican oil, but also going away without paying any compensation.
7 At least that is the Mexican view expressed by several authors in the monthly journal of the National Union of Mexican Economists -Revista de Economía-quoted below. It is also the view of Sangines Villavalva (1938 Marzo). 8 The following sentences mostly come from : López Portillo (1938) . Identical views are expressed by Sangines Villavalva (1938 Marzo) A combination of the institutional and the geological explanations has also been put
forward. Both problems hit almost simultaneously: salt water started to intrude into big
Mexican producing wells as early as 1918, only few months after the new Constitution was passed. According to Yerguin (1991) :
'The salt water was very bad news-it meant the beginning of a decline in oil output. The problem could have been conquered with more capital, better technology and new exploration. But in the midst of the revolutionary turmoil, the foreign companies were loath to step up their investment.'
While the companies and the government were settling their disputes in Mexico, 
THE EARLY PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND THE OIL SHORTAGE OF 1918-1921
The First World War was responsible for the rapid maturity of the petroleum industry.
Just prior to the war, both the U.S. and Great Britain began the conversion of their naval fleets from coal to oil burners. Not only did petroleum propel the newest and fastest war vessels but it also provided fuel for such military innovations as the submarine, the tank and the airplane. As DeNovo (1956) remind us, oil-fed trucks and autos played a military role at war, while petroleum was even a basic constituent of TNT.
The stimulus imparted to industrial and transport technology during the war enormously increased the postwar demand for petroleum products. The merchant fleet and the railways (specially those of the Americas) started the switch to fuel oil engines.
According to the data of the American Petroleum Institute ( 1914 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Bradley) (1931) estimated that by the end of the 1920s, in round numbers, and excluding oil used by oil companies, about 37 per cent of all petroleum was used to produce gasoline, 5 per cent for lubricants, while kerosene, the major market in the early days of the industry, only used 8 per cent of all petroleum produced. Practically all the remainder half was used as gas or fuel oil. This fuel oil was principally used for bunkering ships and as locomotive fuel, for which coal, supplied largely by Great Britain, was formerly used. Nevertheless, the contribution of oil to the world energy supply at this time must not be exaggerated. In 1925, solid fuels supplied 82,9 per cent of the energy consumed, liquid fuels, 13.2 per cent, natural gas 3.2 per cent and hydroelectric power 0.7 per cent (See Darmstadter and al. (1971) ).
Between the other results of the War a spirit of nationalism was awakened in all countries, which involved the ideas of self-determination, self-preservation and national security. The latter idea immediately suggested the importance of conserving the natural resources and raw materials of any given country. These considerations led to the adoption of governmental programs of exclusion or discrimination against foreigners, together with the development of their own natural resources by their own citizens. In form, such protection was either legislative, as, for example, the enactment of restrictive laws; contractual, as in the case of an agreement between the Government and its citizens for the working of large areas to the exclusion of aliens; or administrative, as where the granting of concessions was left to the discretion of some executive officer who favored the nationals of his own country. In this context, Mexico's raising nationalism was not unique, but rather the norm among the oil producing countries in the early 1920s.
The surge in demand was not coupled with an equally intense growth in the supply of oil.
For the first years of the War demand was well ahead of oil supply. Before the War, the U.S. produced about 60 per cent of the petroleum produced in the world 10 . The second larger producer was Russia, with 20 per cent of the world's production, or in other words, about half of the production outside the U.S. was Russian production. In fact, from 1898 to 1901 Russia led the world in petroleum production. The remaining production was more or less distributed in shares of 2 to 5 per cent of worlds production between Mexico, the Dutch East Indies, British India, Rumania and what it will become Poland after the war. Figure 4 shows the world's oil production between 1900 and 1936 by main producer countries. 10 Unless otherwise stated, all data on production of petroleum used in the paper comes from American Petroleum Institute (1937) pp.56-57. 1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 USA 1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 USA 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 Lost all its domestic oil supplies, the Old Continent was dependent on its Asian oil supplies (Dutch East Indies, Persia and the British India) all of which produced then insufficient amounts to satisfy the European needs and were too remote. Overall the European markets become utterly dependent on the U.S.
The collapse of the main European sources of petroleum coupled with a concatenation of cold winters (1918, 1919 and 1920 were some of the coldest of the 20 th centuries at both sides of the Atlantic), the final War effort and, the increasing difficulties to obtain new petroleum concessions given the awaken nationalism over the exploitation of natural resources.
In Dutch and British also procured mutually exclusive rights in their overseas dominions. In practice, the Dutch-Shell group had secured a quasi-monopoly in the East Indies, while the British Government adopted a policy of complete exclusion of aliens in respect to the oil fields of British India, particularly those of Burma. Anglo-Persian also held almost exclusive rights in Persia.
It was not any easier to obtain new oil rights in Latin America. Argentina was the first Latin American country to establish a national oil company, YPF (1907) and one of the first to pass strict legislative measures in order to limit the activities of private oil companies (see Philip (1982) ). From 1919 and for the first years of the 1920s, both Colombia and Ecuador tried (but mostly failed) to enforce petroleum laws inspired on the Mexican legislation. Despite several modifications to the original laws, the foreign companies argued that the legislations of both countries were far from satisfactory for their interest. According to Wilkins (1974) , in Peru and Bolivia the problems were no so much legislative over property and concessions, as fiscal. Long running conflicts about tax evasion and fraud affected the development of oil production in both countries.
Therefore, it is clear that the very few countries that offered open door policies, such as
Venezuela, Canada, Poland, Egypt or South Africa, were exceptional among the oil producing countries of the early 1920s.
The supply problems led to the creation of the Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference. It was established in February 1918 to pool, coordinate, and control all oil supplies and tanker shipping and along with the introduction of convoys as an antidote to German U-boats-it attempted to solve the Allies' oil supply problems for the rest of the war. Mexican oil was to play a major role at this time of shortage.
THE ROLE OF MEXICO IN THE FIRST OIL SHORTAGE
The Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference was also crated in response to domestic American energy problems. Following Yerguin (1991) estimates, the U.S. was serving its own demanding market plus 80 per cent of the European requirements for oil. By 1918 the surging demand for American oil began to hit the limit of available supplies. The gap was being closed only by using up inventories and by importing more oil from Mexico. Even when imports from Mexico trebled between 1918 and 1921, U.S. petroleum inventories keep falling month after month for most of those three years as shown in Figure 6 .
Average crude oil prices at well, which had doubled in the U.S. from the beginning of the War, will jump another 50 per cent in the couple of years after the armistice (see Figure 8 below). 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 Moreover, Mexican fields were better located than the main U.S. domestic fields to supply the cities of the Atlantic coast where ships were awaiting filled with materials for Europe. Domestically U.S. produced petroleum had a long way to travel to the East coast.
From California the options were either to ship the oil via the Panama channel or by rail since the West coast was not connected by pipe-lines with the rest of the country, while
Oklahoma had no access to sea transport and had to make use of pipelines and rail and most of Texas oil made it to the Gulf Coast first and then be shipped to the Atlantic refineries. Mexican oil fields, per contrast, were very close to the Gulf and crude could be immediately shipped.
Figure 8
Average price, location of oil production and price gradient in the US by 1920s 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 $ Source: American Petroleum Institute (1937) Indeed, the shortage of oil was worse felt in the Atlantic Coast. While it is true the average price oil at wellhead paid in the U. From this depiction it is clear that Mexican crude oil played the crucial role of supplying the U.S. at this time of shortage, so that at the same time, Europe could be also supplied.
By focusing in events outside of Mexico rather than within Mexico it is easier to understand than the rise of the Mexican oil industry had a lot more to do with the events in the international petroleum markets than with mere natural resources lottery as it has been usually portrayed. Mexican oil fields were required to produce at their maximum capacity in the few year the world's market were in most need of oil due to the combination of events described in the previous sections. Consequently Mexico raised to be the second largest petroleum producer in the world after the United States and the largest exporter of petroleum. A position that was short-lived. Whether the fall of the industry was rooted in this peculiar mode of rising is the issue of the last section of the paper.
THE END OF THE SHORTAGE AND THE END OF THE MEXICAN OIL SURGE
Surely, events within Mexico had an impact on the decline of the industry. Nevertheless, it is worth wondering whether parallel to these internal developments, events outside the Mexican (and Venezuelan) territory also had importance in the decline. Given the nature of the rise, it is just natural to peek into the declining side of the story in order to find out 
Figure 9
Mexican exports of crude oil and derivatives 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1930 1931 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 barrels At the world level the surging production in Venezuela and Persia added to the return to production and exports of Russia (which began to be felt by 1924), plus the contribution of the new smaller producers of South America (Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Trinidad).
All together made that for the first time since the beginning of the War, supply of oil run ahead of demand from 1925 onwards.
The shortage ended, so it did the crucial role played by Mexican oil as supplier of the U.S. market. What did not end were the uncertainties in the world petroleum industry.
The scenario for a worldwide rush for oil was set at the end of the War. Oil was sought out in more countries during the second half of 1920s than never before. Yet the nationalism awaken during the War made it difficult for the companies to secure new exploration contracts and nothing could guarantee that previously signed agreements were to be honored.
At the same time, the shortage confronted the U.S. petroleum industry with a largely overlooked problem. The oilmen and the government alike suddenly realized that the sources of supply of the domestic industry were concentrated within its own borders and in Mexico. It was the time to launch an 'aggressive American oil policy abroad', as labeled by DeNovo (1956) . This new policy pushed U.S. companies to seek out new supplies on a worldwide basis, either by exploration or by purchase of existing production, just to find out things were not going to be that easy. It came as a bitter realization for U.S. oil companies to find that by the early 1920s the British companies, which were currently turning out about 15 per cent of the world's production, had somehow acquired more than half the world's estimated future reserves thanks to the rights acquired by Royal Dutch-Shell and Anglo-Persian Oil Co which held quasimonopolies in Venezuela, Persia, Dutch East Indies, British East and West Indies.
It is not heroic to presume that the uncertainties in the world's petroleum industry had a negative impact on the Mexican oil industry. Not only had the U.S. lost interest in
Mexican oil by mere fact of finding exceeding domestic supplies, but also the U.S.
industry had now a new active policy for securing reserves elsewhere. Haber et al. (2003) argued that the oil companies continued to explore and invest in Mexico well after output began to fall, and they simply left because they could not find more oil. The truth is that companies were exploring for oil in Mexico with less intensity that they were doing elsewhere during the 1920s as can be deducted from the figures of U.S. exports of petroleum machinery and equipment shown in Table 1 . 1915 $18.343.175 $1.860.437 10,1 1922 $25.035.840 $5.775.994 23,1 $9.715.077 $3.165.586 32,6 $15.320.763 $2.610.408 17,0 1925 $57.257.369 $6.171.324 10,8 $30.681.972 $2.822.112 9,2 $26.575.397 $3.349.212 12,6 1930 $147.933.354 $5.628.565 3,8 $59.795.404 $2.283.509 3,8 $81.960 For sure the average flow of drilling investment into Mexico all along the 1920s, although declining, was higher than the drilling investments done in the previous decade.
Yet, from the previous discussion it is also clear that the rush for oil speeded up all over the world after the War; so it did petroleum investment worldwide. Thus, at least in the 1920s Mexico's future as oil producer looked as bright as its main competitor, Venezuela.
It could also be argued that petroleum seek and found elsewhere was cheaper and of higher quality than Mexican oil, thus with greater competence Mexican oil industry was unable to survive. By the mid 1920s he U.S. started to import oil from countries different than Mexico (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Trinidad). The immediate question is whether these countries had any cost or quality advantage over Mexico. Table   2 report the results of an enquiry by the U.S. Tariff Commission (1932) in this direction.
The results indicate that in fact, only Venezuelan oil was cheaper to import into the U.S.
than Mexican oil, but none of the other countries had any price advantage over Mexico.
The report does not suggest that neither of the competing countries had any quality advantage over Mexico.
Table 2
Quantities of foreign crude oil used by U.S. Atlantic coast refineries and average delivered price per barrel (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) Overall, the paper shows that the changes that took place in the petroleum industry worldwide during the Great War years and its aftermath, and the shortage of oil that occurred in the world's markets between 1918-1921 are crucial events in order to understand the early rise of the Mexican oil industry and set the basis for a better understanding of the subsequent sudden decline.
